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For any public policy issue with scarce financial resources and impending 
deadlines, decision makers must find or construct a public engagement process that is 
both useful in terms of satisfying participants and producing an outcome as well as 
practical in terms of the budget and time constraints. This report explores the history of 
groundwater management in Texas, identifies current problems with the public 
involvement processes under House Bill 1763, and proposes different options for seeking 
public input. Groundwater is a quasi-public good and, as population growth continues to 
put pressure on a scarce and finite resource, public input is increasingly considered 
valuable in crafting desired future conditions and management strategies necessary to 
achieve those conditions. This report evaluates four public input processes in the context 
of groundwater management in Texas. The evaluation criteria and the processes may be 
 vii 
useful for other public policy issues. In assessing these four processes, a correlation 
emerges between satisfying transparency, neutrality, representation and flexibility, and 
the increase in time and cost of the process. However, the benefits of a full public 
engagement process may far outweigh the front-loaded cost.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“A fundamental challenge for administrative governance is reconciling the need 
for expertise in managing administrative programs with the transparency and 
participation demanded by a democratic system.”1 
Public engagement processes have long been part of making public policy, 
especially for environmental issues and natural resources. These processes began as 
methods for informing the public about policy issues to gain support and evolved into 
methods where the public directly participates in making decisions.2 The first 
formalization of these processes came about in the 1940s with the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Government agencies were ordered to provide notice of decision making 
procedures to the public, provide information about the issue and take comments.3 By the 
1960s and 1970s public participation saw a surge, especially in environmental agencies 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Forest Service, and the 
Bureau of Reclamation.4 The National Environmental Policy Act mirrored the 
Administrative Act of the 1940s, requiring public notice of governing body meetings and 
using public hearings to take comments.5  
Critics note that public hearings are more of a formality in governing rather than a 
method for citizen participation.6 According to Lando, this process of a governing body 
sitting at a dais taking timed comments from individuals “in favor of” and “opposed to” a 
                                               
1 Thomas Beierle and Jerry Cayford, “Introduction,” in Democracy in Practice: Public Participation in 
Environmental Decisions, (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2002), 3. 
2 James L. Creighton, “Public Participation in Federal Agencies’ Decision Making in the 1990s,” National 
Civic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Fall 1999): 249. 
3 Beierle and Cayford, “Introduction,” 3. 
4 Creighton, “Public Participation,” 250. 
5 Ibid., 250. 
6 Tom Lando, “The Public Hearing Process: A Tool for Citizen Participation or a Path Toward Citizen 
Alienation?” National Civic Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Spring 2003): 73. 
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policy or decision engenders adversarial positions rather than agreement.7 Simply posting 
notices and taking comments through these legally required processes did not result in 
acceptance of the decisions.8 A different approach was needed. 
The different approach appeared with the growth of the alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) movement. ADR researchers promulgated using neutral third-party 
mediators to facilitate decisions for many types of conflicting situations. The EPA 
instituted negotiated rulemaking – a process where conflicting parties participate in 
writing regulations with help from a third-party mediator.9 Even with the emergence of 
contemporary methods such as mediation and consensus building, the standard public 
hearing has persisted in national, state and local statutes as a minimum requirement for 
public participation. McKinney and Harmon note, “Agencies say they are overworked 
and understaffed, and that dwindling budgets are further tapped by public participation 
requirements.”10 Public hearings are quick and inexpensive relative to other processes. 
Can a public involvement process be made more meaningful without tapping out 
financial and temporal resources? How does an agency go about evaluating and designing 
such a process? 
Before embarking upon evaluating and choosing a public involvement process, it 
is of the utmost importance that the governing body knows the purpose of the process.11 
Will the final product be a statement of values, a number, or a list of actions? Will the 
product be used as an advisory opinion to the governing board, or stand as the decision 
itself? The governing body must be able to make the connection between the outcome of 
                                               
7 Lando, “The Public Hearing Process,” 73, 76. 
8 Creighton, “Public Participation,” 250. 
9 Ibid., 257. 
10 Matthew McKinney and Will Harmon, “Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making: Is It 
Working?” National Civic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Summer 2002): 149. 
11 Ibid., 155-156. 
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the public process and the decision that will be enforced. The public must also be aware 
of this connection from the beginning, otherwise, such a process is a waste of resources 
and the result may be challenged by those who feel wronged or alienated. Once a 
governing entity identifies the role of the outcome, then it can go about evaluating and 
choosing a public process. 
Groundwater management in Texas is an excellent illustrative case study for 
demonstrating the complexity of many environmental policy issues and the need for 
improved public involvement processes. The ripeness and complexity of the issue also 
shows that a better process needs to be in place before dramatic change occurs. 
According to the United States Census Bureau, Texas is one of the fastest growing states 
by population percentage, increasing by 14.6 percent in the last seven years to total 23.9 
million people in 2007.12 Population growth combined with development, pollution and 
climate change threaten the quantity and quality of all water resources in the United 
States. Even if a municipality, county or another political entity does not feel pressure 
from its own population to exploit the local water resource, water stressed entities will 
eventually show interest and offer to buy the water to export it back to their area. Notable 
examples in Texas are the battles among environmentalists, municipal authorities and 
developers over Caddo Lake in East Texas and Canyon Lake in Central Texas. As water 
resources become scarcer, government intervention is needed to help ensure equity and 
accountability in resource planning and management.  
The State Legislature recently required groundwater managers all over Texas to 
plan the future of the resource on an aquifer wide level rather than smaller localized 
levels. Managers had a little over two years to report these plans before December 2007.  
Yet, only one planning area was able to make a few decisions by the deadline. The 
                                               
12 U.S. Census Bureau, “National and State Population Estimates,” 
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-pop-chg.html (accessed January 19, 2007). 
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complexity of groundwater and the lack of guidance on public processes have hindered 
managers. Some groundwater managers and policy makers contend that with or without a 
meaningful public involvement process, it is likely there will be legal challenges to 
management decisions. However, a meaningful public involvement process is more likely 
to satisfy the greatest number of interests than no process at all and reduce the likelihood 
of these legal challenges. Processes also create the momentum needed to proceed and 
meet deadlines. 
This report answers the questions: how do public managers evaluate public 
processes when working with a complex policy issue, limited resources, and a 
requirement to do only the bare minimum such as a public hearing? How do decision 
makers strike a balance between a process that is both satisfying for the participants and 
practical for the decision makers? The management of public and quasi-public goods, 
such as groundwater, requires much more flexible public engagement processes that 
actually allow meaningful public input as well as adapt to multiple jurisdictions, 
resources, stakeholder groups, and complex scientific data.  
This report uses existing literature on public processes and the literature on 
statutory requirements of groundwater management in Texas to describe the historical 
and current status of the use of public processes in decision making for this resource. 
Further considering basic criteria, evaluating methods and adaptations of models used in 
environmental planning cases, this report examines four public input methods and 
recommends the range of processes best suited for public involvement in groundwater 
management and planning in this state. The results of field work from one public process 
and the results of a questionnaire sent to state groundwater managers are used as primary 
sources of data about the needs and challenges of public processes in Texas groundwater 
management.  
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The findings of this report show that a range of public processes can be both 
useful for the decision makers and satisfy participants’ needs to be heard and to 
participate in a fair and open process. When the resources are available, a full blown 
public engagement process such as consensus building or a citizens jury should be used. 
Yet, when resources and time are limited, simply augmenting the traditional methods, 
such as using a neutral facilitator at open meetings, to meet more of the qualitative 
criteria can still result in a worthwhile process.   
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 elaborates on the 
historical context of groundwater management in Texas and the need for evaluation of 
several public involvement methods. Chapter 3 presents the methodology and criteria as 
well as introduces the four types of public input processes examined. Chapter 4 applies 
the four processes to groundwater management in Texas and evaluates their practicality 
for implementation. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the findings that are 
applicable to any policy issue. It also recommends options for consideration by the 




Chapter 2: Overview of Groundwater Management in Texas 
Today, it is necessary to plan for the current and future use of any water resource. 
Any reason not to do so is not a reason but an excuse. In addition to daily life in the 
home, groundwater is needed for agriculture, businesses, recreation and wildlife habitat. 
Texas has been planning water use on a state and regional level for decades. The result is 
that even with population growth and drought, Texas has not yet faced a situation like 
that of Georgia and Lake Lanier where decades of poor water planning coupled with 
drought led to a state of emergency.13 Water is nonetheless still an ever increasingly 
scarce common resource in this state, and the public should be involved in the planning 
process.  
This chapter uses groundwater to illustrate the complexity of many environmental 
and natural resource planning policy issues and demonstrate the need for more public 
involvement in planning and decision making as well as the need for evaluating how the 
public should be involved. This chapter examines groundwater as a quasi-public good 
and the difficulties in managing such a good. It shows how the historical context of 
groundwater management in Texas reinforces the complexity of the issue as well as the 
problems with current statutory requirements for managing this common pool resource. 
The chapter concludes with the results from the questionnaire sent to state groundwater 
managers. These results further support the need for an evaluation of public involvement 
processes. 
                                               
13 Matt Kempner, “Recipe for a Water Crisis: Plan. Fail. Repeat,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
December 16, 2007, sec. 1A. 
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GROUNDWATER AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
In Texas, land owners are led to believe that they have unlimited right to water on 
their land through the Rule of Capture. Because of the Rule of Capture, many may see 
groundwater as a private good, one defined by property rights. The Rule states that a 
property owner has the right to all the water under his or her property.14 This means that 
landowners may pump as much water as they want from their land, regardless of the 
consequences for neighboring property owners. Yet, groundwater is not a private good 
and should not be subject to landowner’s private desires. The defining criteria of a private 
good are excludability, meaning it is possible to deny someone the good; and rival in 
consumption, meaning it is not possible for more than one person to consume the good at 
one time.15 A public good is the opposite: it is non-excludable and non-rival in 
consumption.  
The Rule of Capture and the nature of groundwater preclude groundwater from 
being a private good. In regard to the first criterion, excludability, a land owner cannot be 
denied the groundwater underneath his or her property according to the Rule. Unless an 
authority is willing and able to monitor all wells and withdrawals on all properties over 
the aquifer, or the legislature eliminates the Rule, the groundwater is non-excludable. The 
second criterion, rival in consumption is less clear. Because aquifers are large enough to 
span underneath multiple tracts of property, it is possible for two or more property 
owners above an aquifer to pump groundwater from the aquifer at the same time. Yet, 
one land owner pumping excessive amounts of water from his property could in theory 
                                               
14 Harry Potter, “History and Evolution of the Rule of Capture,” in 100 Years of Rule of Capture: From 
East to Groundwater Management, ed. William Mullican and Suzanne Schwartz (Texas Water 
Development Board, June 2004), 1. 
15 Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, “Public Goods and Public Choices,” in Policentricity and Local Public 
Economies, ed. Michael D. McGinnis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 76-77. 
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prevent another land owner over the same aquifer from pumping water because of 
drawdown. Thus, groundwater may be rival in consumption.  
To further complicate the matter, some above-ground springs that depend on 
aquifer levels and flows are open to the public for recreational use. Finally, groundwater 
is so basic to human needs, to economies, and to wildlife that it is essential to the public 
welfare. Since groundwater is non-excludable, but sometimes rival in consumption, it 
cannot be a pure public good. Economists call goods such as groundwater a quasi-public 
good or a common pool resource. Regardless of the technical name, these goods must be 
managed differently than private goods because market forces are unable to control the 
resource in a way that maximizes social welfare. 
Renowned environmental economist and native Texan Garrett Hardin presents the 
problem of an unmanaged commons. When a common resource, such as groundwater, is 
unmanaged, users will consume it until they are satisfied without considering the 
negative effects of overuse on other users.16 The accumulation of these individual 
decisions often results in the depletion of the resource.17 Under the Rule of Capture alone, 
groundwater is an unmanaged common resource. Hardin proposes two alternatives to an 
unmanaged common resource: privatism or socialism. Hardin claims that while both 
privatism and socialism have the possibility of success or failure, an unmanaged common 
resource will always fail.18 As noted above, groundwater cannot practically or legally be 
converted into a private good regulated by a market. This leaves socialism, which 
according to Hardin is when the public “appoint[s] a manager to control its 
                                               
16 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons,” in Evolutionary Perspectives on 
Environmental Problems, ed. Dustin J. Penn and Iver Mysterud (New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction, 
2007), 105. 
17 Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Policansky, 
“Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges,” in Evolutionary Perspectives on 
Environment Problems, ed. Dustin J. Penn and Iver Mysterud (New Brunswich: Aldine Transation, 2007), 
129.  
18 Hardin, “Unmanaged Commons,” 106. 
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exploitation.”19 The question that remains is how should the manager of a public good 
manage that resource? Hardin gives no specific answer.  
Hardin’s “socialism” strategy closely represents the current structure of 
groundwater management in Texas. Through constitutional amendments and legislation, 
the state has been divided into jurisdictional areas, and the people of those areas have 
given authority over groundwater to a manager. Yet, the Rule of Capture remains in 
place. Policymakers have created an inherent conflict between a private property rule and 
legislation that indirectly limits that rule. This further complicates how managers should 
go about managing groundwater and including public involvement in the decision 
process.  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF WATER PLANNING IN TEXAS 
Texas has been formally planning the use of its water resources since approving a 
constitutional amendment on public water development in 1904. Voters approved the 
creation of the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) in 1957, thereby giving the 
agency the authority to issue bonds for water development and conservation projects. 
Over the last half of the century, voters approved other constitutional amendments that 
allowed groundwater conservation districts (GCDs or Districts) to regulate the spacing of 
wells and how much water the wells may produce through a permit process.20 Citizens 
may create a GCD through a local petition.21 GCDs range in size from several counties to 
                                               
19 Hardin, “Unmanaged Commons,” 106. 
20 GCDs were first approved by the legislature in the 1949. They steadily gained traction, popularity and 
more authority through the 1990s. Robert Mace, Rima Petrossian, Robert Bradley and William Mullican, 
“A Streetcar Named Desired Future Conditions: The New Groundwater Availability for Texas,” in The 
Changing Face of Water Rights in Texas, Chapter 3.1 (San Antonio: State Bar of Texas, 2006), 1. 
21 Texas Water Development Board, http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/gwrd/gcd/faqgen.htm#g1 (accessed 
January 27, 2008). 
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only a few square miles. GCDs are controlled by a board of local representatives who 
may choose to hire a professional manager.22 
The fact that GCDs are small jurisdictional entities whose boundaries do not 
follow the geological boundaries of aquifers means that different GCDs may seek to 
manage the same aquifer with different plans and regulations. For example, assume that 
GCD #1 and GCD #2 are located over the same aquifer. Development is booming in 
GCD #1, and some stakeholders wish to increase the amount of water pumped from the 
aquifer. Meanwhile, GCD #2 is not experiencing development pressure and would like to 
preserve spring flow in a recreational area. Some stakeholders in GCD #2 do not want an 
increase in pumping from the shared aquifer. These two GCDs seek to manage the same 
aquifer yet with opposing strategies. This system led to regional conflicts over water 
management. 
In 1998, the TWDB established regional water planning areas to plan 
development and conservation of both ground and surface water resources in a 
geographical area.23 Managed by a coordinating body of local representatives, these 
sixteen regions span hundreds of miles. (See Appendix A, Illustration 1.) The boundaries 
are political and do not help resolve the problems presented by planning a regional 
resource at a localized level.  
In 2005, Texas House Bill 1763 (HB 1763) mandated management and planning 
of Texas groundwater resources on a regional aquifer basis. It formalized entities called 
Groundwater Management Areas (GMAs or Areas) with borders that follow the 
geological boundaries of the state’s major aquifer systems. (See Appendix A, Illustrations 
2 and 3.) The mandate calls for these areas to determine the “desired future condition” 
                                               
22 A glossary of terms is found at the end of the appendices to this report. 
23 Texas Water Development Board, http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/about/history.asp (accessed January 27, 
2008). 
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(DFCs) of their aquifer(s) and set goals for water quality, aquifer volume and spring 
flows.24 Under this system, neighboring GCDs must work together to develop a 
management strategy for shared aquifers. Mace writes, “The desired future conditions 
statements must be adopted by a two-thirds vote of at least two thirds of the districts 
located in whole or in part in the groundwater management area.”25 Thus, GCDs have the 
ultimate authority in formulating the desired future condition of the aquifer that then must 
be approved by the Texas Water Development Board, but they must do so collectively as 
a GMA. GCDs may develop different DFCs for sub-regions of an aquifer as long as it is 
approved by the same voting system.26 
Finally, GCDs have the authority to enforce any rules or regulations under their 
jurisdiction through fines and orders of injunction.27 The Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality has the authority to take action against GCDs who do not enforce 
their rules.28 However, not every area of Texas is incorporated into a GCD. Thus, those 
areas are subject solely to the Rule of Capture. Even though GCD boards have the 
authority to regulate groundwater use and trump the Rule, the Rule remains in place.29 
This conflict has been challenged in court multiple times and the Texas Supreme Court 
has set the precedent of siding with the Districts.30 
                                               
24 Texas House of Representatives, House Bill 1763, Sec. 36.108d., 79th Legislature, regular session, 
(Austin, Texas: 2005). 
25 Mace et al., “A Streetcar Named Desired Future Conditions,” 4. 
26 Ibid., 4. 
27 Texas Water Code, Section 36.102a-d, http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/wa.toc.htm (accessed March 30, 
2008). 
28 Texas Water Code, Section 36.3011, http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/wa.toc.htm (accessed March 30, 
2008). 
29 “The ownership and rights of the owners of the land and their lessees and assigns in groundwater are 
hereby recognized, and nothing in this code shall be construed as depriving or divesting the owners or their 
lessees and assigns of the ownership or rights, except as those rights may be limited or altered by rules 
promulgated by a district.” Texas Water Code, Section 36.002, http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/wa.toc.htm, 
(accessed March 30, 2008). 
30 Michael J. Booth and Ross Richard-Crow, “Regulatory Dance: Chapter 36 and District Perspective,” in 
100 Years of Rule of Capture: From East to Groundwater Management, ed. William Mullican and Suzanne 
Schwartz (Texas Water Development Board, June 2004), 24, 31. 
 12 
OVERVIEW OF THE DESIRED FUTURE CONDITION PROCESS 
House Bill 1763 mandates GMAs to determine the “desired future condition” of 
their aquifer(s), but fails to specify a process for doing so. Managers are to use the DFC 
to define “managed available groundwater” (MAG), or the amount of water available for 
permitting. They use this number to set permitting limits within each GMA. The amount 
of MAG is also used by the State’s regional water planning groups. Desired future 
conditions are intended to “improve groundwater management in Texas by establishing 
groundwater management plans that allow the GMA to establish regional goals that 
would help GCDs permit groundwater use on a coordinated basis over shared aquifers.”31 
Once a GMA has decided on its desired future condition, it must submit a 
proposal to the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB). The TWDB uses models to 
estimate withdrawals based on the desired future condition and then calculates the 
amount of managed available groundwater. The MAG is then reported back to the GCDs 
and to the regional water planning groups. The early decision deadline for a DFC was 
December 2007. DFCs that were submitted to the TWDB and approved by that time will 
be included in the 2011 regional water plan. For any GMA that did not make a decision 
by December 2007, the final deadline for its first DFC is September 2011. The DFC 
process is iterative; it must be reviewed at least every five years after 2010, but it can be 
reviewed more often at the discretion of the GMA. Other than the requirement of one 
public hearing prior to approval, HB 1763 gives no direction as to what criteria should be 
used to determine a DFC, how often it should be reviewed, or what these processes 
should entail. 
                                               
31 Ahmed Abukhater, Erica Allis, Anna Bricker, Brenner Brown, Caleb Brown, Leigh Byford, Michael 
Ciarleglio, et al., “The Future of Groundwater in the Texas Hill Country,” ed. Dr. David Eaton, Policy 
Research Project Working Paper, Groundwater Management in Texas Policy Research Project, (University 
of Texas, Austin, 2007), xix. 
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Missing the deadline for submitting a DFC for the Regional Water Plan has 
consequences. The University of Texas graduate students who worked with GMA 9 note, 
“Inclusion into a plan is important because a water management strategy excluded from a 
regional plan may preclude the TWDB from providing money for infrastructure 
investment to municipalities, water supply corporations, or other water providers with the 
GCD.”32 There are no other formal consequences from the legislature if a GMA does not 
turn in a decision on its desired future conditions. However, informal consequences 
include mismanagement of the resource according to public desires and risk of protest, 
and lack of scientific evaluation of the aquifer’s ability to support those desires. Further 
consequences from such mismanagement may be felt as negative effects on the regional 
economy and wildlife habitat.  
PROBLEMS WITH DEVELOPING A DESIRED FUTURE CONDITION 
So what exactly is a desired future condition and why is it so difficult to 
determine one? The following six sections explore the inherent complications of this 
groundwater management policy. Many of these complications are common to other 
environmental planning and management policy issues. 
1. Vagueness and Ambiguity in an Unfunded Mandate 
HB 1763 states that GMAs and GCDs must hold any meeting discussing 
management policy in accordance with open meetings laws. When a DFC is ready to be 
submitted to the TWDB for review, the GMA must hold at least one public hearing 
before submission. If a conflict arises regarding the DFC, the GMA is also required to 
hold at least one public hearing to take comment. The legislation gives no further 
direction about how GMAs and GCDs should go about deciding upon a desired future 
                                               
32 Abukhater et al, “Future of Groundwater,” 7. 
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condition. While this allows the process to be flexible and open according to each 
GMA’s circumstances, it leaves it open to the point of total ambiguity.  
Furthermore, the term “desired future condition” is as vague as a legislated phrase 
can get. It is unclear whether the DFC is referring to volume of water in the aquifer, a rate 
of spring flow, the amount of drawdown in the aquifer, or the amount of water that may 
be permitted or withdrawn from a well. It is also not clear whether the DFC should 
specify different conditions regarding water based on climate, whether it should include 
water quality conditions, or how far into the future the DFC should go. According to the 
Texas Water Development Board, “the diversity of desired future aquifer conditions [is] 
limited only by the creativity of a GMA,” and the capacity of a model to compute the 
meaning of a DFC into managed available groundwater.33 Any of the previously 
mentioned options is a possibility. A GMA may interpret future as any period of time – 
10, 20 or 50 years, for example. Robert Mace of the TWDB writes, “in essence, a desired 
future condition is a management goal that captures the philosophy and policies 
addressing how an aquifer will be managed.”34 If a GMA has more than one aquifer, each 
aquifer may have its own DFC and any subdivisions of an aquifer may have their own 
DFCs. 
Finally, HB 1763 is an unfunded mandate. This complex process requires 
communication, education, and negotiation which must be done on a regular basis to 
achieve success in a timely manner. Area and District board members must travel to 
conduct meetings to discuss groundwater availability, points of discharge and recharge, 
and other geological data. Most GMAs cover large geographical areas spanning more 
than twenty counties and hundreds of miles. If they choose public involvement in the 
                                               
33 Abukhater et al, “Future of Groundwater,” 4. 
34 Mace et al, “A Streetcar Named Desired Future Conditions,” 3. 
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process beyond one public hearing, they must organize those efforts and pay for any 
costs. GCDs get most of their funding from ad valorem taxes or levied fees in their 
districts. Taxes and fees are an unpredictable and contradictory income stream for the 
GCDs. A downturn in the economy and development can adversely affect a district’s 
funding. For those that collect fees for drilling new wells, the only way to collect revenue 
to fund the conservation of water is to permit more wells and thus more water use. Most 
districts have barely enough in the budget to fund the salary of their manager and general 
operating expenses.  
The vagueness and ambiguity in HB 1763 results in managers and board members 
who have neither direction on where or how to start defining their desired future 
condition, nor the resources to assist them with their process. 
2. Multiple Jurisdictions and Geographical Boundaries 
There are sixteen GMAs with boundaries based on those of major aquifers. More 
than eighty smaller GCDs exist within the GMAs, but their boundaries were formed 
across geographical and political lines. Though GCDs within a GMA may have differing 
values about how to engage the public and manage the same shared water resource based 
on political, economic and geographical variations, the GCDs must agree as a GMA on a 
desired future condition. Desired future conditions must be set at the Area level based on 
geological boundaries because an above-ground District political boundary cannot extend 
underneath to the groundwater. Two neighboring districts, one that wishes to permit more 
groundwater withdrawals and one that does not, must work together to successfully 
determine a DFC. Otherwise, the shared groundwater resource will end up as one of 
Hardin’s unmanaged commons. 
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3. Multiple Stakeholders 
Researchers for the collaborative process used in GMA 9 identified at least five 
general stakeholder groups: the governing GCD boards; county and city officials; 
agricultural interests including farmers and ranchers; environmental groups that support 
water and wildlife conservation; and developers building homes and businesses in the 
region. In some respects, these groups’ values differed greatly, even among individuals 
within the groups. The issues included balancing population growth and conservation, 
whether and how to limit pumping, and priorities for water use.35 On other issues such as 
responsible stewardship of the land and resources, each group fundamentally agreed.36 
While most stakeholders were willing to work together, some expressed a lack of trust 
toward others. In most cases, the mistrust was directed toward developers for their 
alleged profit-seeking interest, or toward GCD board members for their alleged misuse of 
authority.37 Differences in values and lack of trust made communication difficult in 
public meetings where GMA 9 actively sought the public’s input. These problems would 
have presented significant barriers had GMA 9 sought agreement from its various 
stakeholder groups through a consensus building process. Potentially, more numerous or 
more varied stakeholder groups exist in other GMAs across the state. The scarcer the 
resource, the more mistrust becomes an issue between water users and managers. Lack of 
trust among interest groups is often a problem for many types of policy issues and is one 
of the most important aspects to address in a public engagement process.  
4. Inadequate Scientific Data 
“Resources that are intrinsically difficult to measure or that require measurement 
with advanced technology…are difficult to manage no matter what the scale of the 
                                               
35 Abukhater et al, “Future of Groundwater,” 14. 
36 Ibid., 13. 
37 Ibid., 14, 27, 62, 80. 
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resource.”38 It would be much easier to manage groundwater if there were sound 
scientific data and agreement about aquifer levels, recharge and pumping limits, and 
climate patterns. Not only are geologists unsure about how much water is in various 
aquifers, or at what rate it will recharge, but GMA and GCD managers do not know 
exactly how many active wells are in their region and how much water is withdrawn from 
each. The Texas Water Code states that all wells must be registered and apply for a 
permit through the local GCD.39 New wells are registered when the owner applies for a 
permit; old wells are registered on an ongoing basis. Local authorities have few resources 
for enforcement of such regulations. Additionally, the Water Code lists three exemptions 
for well permitting, namely for a domestic well that physically cannot produce more than 
25,000 gallons per day, and wells solely for oil or other mining activities.40 Even though 
these wells may be registered, these permitting exemptions make it difficult for GCD 
managers to formulate policy based off numbers because the numbers do not reflect true 
pumping measures. 
5. Demographic Changes 
Along with the unknowns such as aquifer levels, drought, and the number of 
wells, what geologists and managers do know is that increased population growth in 
many areas of Texas has put pressure on both ground and surface water resources. For 
example, Central Texas, the Hill Country, and northern Bexar County have experienced 
dramatic increases in population and development. The population of Williamson and 
Hays counties increased between 20 and 29 percent from 2000 to 2004. Comal, Kendall 
and Bandera counties increased between 10 and 19 percent, and Blanco, Gillespie and 
                                               
38 Ostrom et al, “Revisiting the Commons,” 130. 
39 Texas Water Code, Chapter 36.113, http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/wa.toc.htm (accessed January 11, 
2008). 
40 Texas Water Code, Chapter 36.117, http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/wa.toc.htm (accessed January 11, 
2008). 
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Kerr counties increased by less than 10 percent over the same period.41 Areas such as 
these typically lack adequate surface water resources to supply the needs of the 
surrounding population, or it is impractical to fund and build infrastructure for surface 
water.  
In addition to increasing use of the resource, migrants to the area often do not 
have knowledge of the resource or similar values for its use. Public goods theorist 
Ostrom contends, “[W]hen new users arrive through migration, they do not share a 
similar understanding of how the resource works and what rules and norms are shared by 
others.”42 Such uses include urban and domestic use versus rural agricultural use; such 
norms include excessive lawn irrigation versus conservation. The shift from rural to 
urban water priorities in Texas due to population growth cannot be emphasized enough. 
The value differences between historical users and new users create an environment for 
feuds and perpetuate feelings of mistrust. These consequences of demographic changes 
increase the difficulty of managing groundwater. 
6. Public Information 
Finally, the lack of public knowledge about hydrogeology and aquifers, water 
conservation and the desired future conditions process present another barrier to public 
involvement in the DFC process as well as management strategies for a DFC. It is tough 
to engage people on a subject they know little about and elicit their values. A repeated 
mantra of almost every stakeholder in the GMA 9 public involvement process was for the 
GMA and GCDs to do more to inform the public about groundwater issues and 
management through the media and schools. The limited financial and human resources 
of GMAs make this difficult. 
                                               
41 United States Census Bureau, “Texas Population Estimates,” http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/2005/tx_popchange2004.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008). 
42 Ostrom et al, “Revisiting the Commons,” 134. 
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THE NEED FOR EVALUATION OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT PROCESSES IN 
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 
Despite the various shortcomings of the desired future conditions process, it can 
be an effective instrument if managers have the right resources and take action to address 
the shortcomings rather than shy away from them. Otherwise, GMAs may fail to meet 
legislated DFC deadlines, and the resource may not be managed according to public 
needs and desires. Potential consequences are not putting the resource to its most valued 
use resulting in legal challenges and, especially in the case of severe drought or 
overpopulation, running out of water.  
Why should the public be involved in the planning of a common resource? The 
obvious answer is that a public resource ought to be managed according to the public’s 
preferences. What if members of the public have different preferences? What if members 
of the public have difficulty forming a preference because they lack sufficient 
information about the resource? A movement/theory called deliberative democracy posits 
that it is the responsibility of citizens to participate in their democracy, and that provided 
information and an opportunity for meaningful input and deliberation, ordinary citizens – 
not just experts or policymakers – can indicate their preferences and make reasonable and 
legitimate recommendations about public policy issues.43 Public hearings are insufficient 
as the bare minimum for public involvement in a policy issue such as groundwater 
management. GMAs need an adequate, practical and integrative method for public and 
stakeholder involvement in groundwater management and planning so that they may 
determine a desired future condition that results in a managed rather than an unmanaged 
common resource. The analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of several processes will 
                                               
43 John Gastil, “A Nation That (Sometimes) Likes to Talk: A Brief History of Deliberation in the United 
States,” in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, ed. John Gastil and Peter Levine (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2005), 3. 
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determine the most practical method for achieving public involvement that elicits useful 
information. 
The definition of “public” in public involvement must be made clear and 
distinguished from the definition of stakeholders. Property owners with active wells and 
people without wells but who otherwise use water from aquifers have a direct stake in the 
planning, management and use of groundwater. This report refers to these individuals or 
groups as direct stakeholders and should be included in the planning and management 
process. But because groundwater is a quasi-public good, managers should also attempt 
to include the general public who may derive direct or indirect use from that 
groundwater, regardless of their knowledge of the subject or their frequency of the direct 
or indirect use. How that public input will be solicited and used by GMAs remains 
variable across processes and will be explored in later chapters. Moreover, for the 
purposes of this report, the words involvement, engagement, participation and input are 
considered synonymous. 
In regard to public involvement, the law states that any meeting held within a 
GMA must be in accordance with the state open meeting laws and that an Area is 
obligated to hold at least one public hearing before a desired future condition is 
approved.44 The sixteen GMAs and the eighty-nine smaller GCDs follow these minimum 
requirements and generally shy away from additional public input methods. To assess 
what additional input methods are being used across the state, the methodology consisted 
of sending a questionnaire to each GMA. (To review a blank questionnaire, see Appendix 
B). 
GMA 9 in the Texas Hill Country used a collaborative process by holding 10 to 
15 open meetings, six open information sessions, and interviewing about 30 
                                               
44 Texas House, HB 1763, Sec. 36.108n. 
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representatives of five stakeholder groups. University of Texas graduate students and 
Center for Public Policy Dispute Resolution staff acted as neutral facilitators and 
researchers during this process. Several barriers slowed down the process of reaching a 
decision: a significant lack of trust among the stakeholder groups and between the 
stakeholder groups and the GMA/GCD boards; a critical lack of public knowledge about 
the DFC process and water conservation; and insufficient scientific data about the six 
major and minor aquifers in GMA 9. Despite these barriers, GMA 9 reports that the 
information it received from the public during the process was “extremely useful.”45 The 
public input was incorporated into two DFCs that are still pending approval of the TWDB 
and the final GMA vote. GMA 9 plans to review its DFC at least once per year and seek 
public input for that review. 
Answers to the questionnaire revealed that some other GMAs utilize websites and 
local media to share information. One GMA reported holding meetings with stakeholders 
while another reported mailing out a survey. Seven of the ten GMAs that responded 
reported a sense of urgency regarding groundwater management in their Area, and GMA 
2 reported a sense of “concern.”46 Among the GMAs, reported reasons include population 
growth, agricultural industry, pressure to sell water to other regions or corporations, and 
subsidence. 
Using groundwater as a case study, this chapter demonstrated the complexity of 
environmental policy issues and the need for evaluation of several public involvement 
processes to achieve a decision that will be accepted, not challenged, by the various 
interests. This report will pick up where Hardin and the State legislature have left off and 
explore the strengths and weaknesses of several public input processes and evaluate them 
                                               
45 Ron Fieseler, GMA 9 questionnaire, February 26, 2008. 
46 Jason Coleman, GMA 2 questionnaire, March 3, 2008. 
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as they apply to groundwater management in Texas. While HB 1763 requires at least one 
public hearing, this minimal level of public involvement is not conducive to sound 
groundwater planning. Traditional public hearings have several weaknesses, namely self-
selection biases, a lack of information sharing, and little opportunity for meaningful 
dialogue. As stated in Chapter 1, the management of public and quasi-public goods, such 
as groundwater, requires much more flexible public engagement processes that actually 
allow meaningful public input as well as adapt to multiple jurisdictions, resources, 
stakeholder groups, and complex scientific data. Additionally, the more the public is 
involved in the decision process the less likelihood of legal challenges to implementation 
after a decision is reached.
47
 
                                               
47 Kim Kovach, “Introduction,” in The Handbook of Alternative Dispute Resolution, ed. Greenspan 
(Austin: State Bar of Texas, 1990), 14. 
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Chapter 3: Policy Alternatives 
In the United States, government agencies and stakeholders increasingly employ 
several types of alternative dispute resolution techniques for environmental planning, 
management and conflict resolution. A broad base of literature examines the best 
methods for public involvement and soliciting the preferences of diverse communities. A 
questionnaire was sent to each of the sixteen GMAs asking for information about the 
nature, frequency and progress of their public involvement process to craft a desired 
future condition. Of the ten GMAs that responded to the questionnaire, all ten reported 
using the traditional and legislated open meetings and public hearings to seek public 
input. Some reported utilizing websites, local media, stakeholder meetings and surveys. 
What other alternatives to these methods could be used without violating the statute? This 
chapter summarizes and compares three commonly used methods – open meetings, 
public hearings, and consensus building. It also introduces one lesser utilized method – 
citizens juries.48  
Some common alternative dispute resolution methods such as mediation and 
arbitration are not examined in this report. These methods are best suited for private 
disputes between two parties and may not be suited for cases which involve multiple 
parties and common pool resources. Public input through surveys is also beyond the 
scope of this report.  
This chapter describes the methodology of this report, details the qualitative and 
quantitative criteria used to evaluate the public involvement processes, and summarizes 
each of the four processes. The chapter concludes with the preliminary finding that 
                                               
48 The description and historical background of the citizens jury method is of greater length because it is a 
lesser known process in Texas. 
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increasingly satisfying the qualitative criteria tends to negatively impact the quantitative 
criteria, suggesting if financial and temporal resources are limited a hybrid of traditional 
and contemporary methods may be necessary to have an adequate process without 
exhausting resources. 
METHODOLOGY 
The processes examined in this report are evaluated on several criteria subdivided 
into qualitative and quantitative categories. Some criteria were adapted from the literature 
on the processes. Others were adapted from the field work in GMA 9 and the responses 
to the questionnaire for groundwater managers.  They are all important factors in 
common resource planning – particularly groundwater in the context of the Texas 
Legislature’s planning rules. The criteria are also meant to be useful for evaluating other 
public involvement processes that are beyond the scope of this report and they are 
relevant to the challenges any public official or manager faces with involving the public 
in other policy issues. 
Qualitative Criteria  
The first criterion is whether a process actually helps managers elicit informed 
input. How the public input will be used must be made clear in the beginning; i.e. will 
participants in a process make the final decision or will they make advisory 
recommendations and the governing body will make the final decision?49 Either way, 
input from someone who knows little about the resource or the policy issue, especially a 
complex or technical issue, may be useless because the suggested action could be 
impractical in the context of the situation. Some might argue that if an individual or 
                                               
49 David Konisky and Thomas Beierle, “Innovations in Public Participation and Environmental Decision 
Making: Examples from the Great Lakes Regions,” Society & Natural Resources, Vol. 14 Issue 9, (Oct 
2001): 817. 
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group provides input on a subject then it must be informed of the subject on some level. 
With the exception of survey methods, this may be true. However, whether the public is 
informed on the matter and to what degree will vary unless the governing body makes an 
effort to provide some information. On the other hand, the elicitation of values may be 
useful and people can have values about an issue without technical knowledge.50 The best 
input is not passively received on a survey sheet or at a public hearing. It is sought 
through dialogue between the governing body and the public, through deliberation 
between various public interests. Deliberative democracy literature contends methods that 
utilize two-way communication produce outcomes that are more acceptable to all 
interests.51 Participants and governing bodies are better able to prioritize values 
concerning the resource and formulate action steps to meet those values when they have 
the same base body of information.52  
Developing trust in the process is the second qualitative criterion. It has four sub-
categories – transparency, neutrality, representation and buy-in. Bias, the lack of 
transparency, and leaving out one or several interests can taint a public process. Fostering 
an atmosphere of trust is the only way to get people to work together, to communicate 
openly, and to reach the best outcome.  First, public input means nothing if the governing 
body or sponsor of the process does not buy into the process or commit on some level to 
the outcome of the process. 53 Without commitment of the sponsor, other participants may 
act differently or provide less candid input if they perceive they will not be taken 
                                               
50 McKinney and Harmon, 160. 
51 Konisky and Beierle, “Innovations,” 822. 
52 Ibid., 822; Susan Carpenter, “Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building Techniques and Strategies,” in 
The Consensus Building Handbook, ed. Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan and Jennifer Thomas-
Larmer (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), 81. 
53 Policy Consensus Initiative, A Practical Guide to Consensus, (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Policy Consensus 
Initative, 2002), 2. 
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seriously, not to mention the entire process would be a waste of resources.54 Equally 
important, participants must buy into the process and commit to the outcome. Participant 
buy-in is more likely when the other sub-criteria – transparency, neutrality, and 
representation – are met.55  
Most public governing bodies meet the transparency criterion because they must 
follow open government or “sunshine” laws in this state. Because it is impossible to 
eliminate personal bias, creating a neutral environment necessitates employing a neutral 
facilitator in any process.56 Whether paid or a volunteer, a third party without a stake in 
the outcome or a role in the decision can provide organization and referee intense issues.  
Third, many open collaborative processes are subject to self-selection bias, the 
fact that participants have opted or volunteered to partake without being asked. While it 
is commendable that citizens volunteer their time and effort to participate in a process, 
the problem here is that they may not be representative of the general public or of all the 
possible interests.57 Facilitators and sponsors must make an effort to correct for the self-
selection bias by ensuring representation of all interests. 
Finally, the flexibility of the process is a key to its success in meeting many of the 
quantitative and qualitative criteria. The ability to adapt to situational characteristics such 
as temporal, geographic, scientific and cost constraints, as well as the number of people 
involved, makes a process more useful across a range of resources and public policy 
issues. The consistent use of one process is another way to spread information and build 
trust. Flexibility also makes it possible to blend methods together for hybrid processes 
                                               
54 Wendy Kenyon, “Enhancing Environmental Decision-making Using Citizens Juries,” Local 
Environment, Vol. 8 Issue 2 (April 2003): 229. 
55 PCI, A Practical Guide, 2. 
56 Carpenter, “Techniques and Strategies,” 67-68; Chris Carlson, “Convening,” in The Consensus Building 
Handbook, ed. Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1999), 181. 
57 Robert E. Goodin, “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics,” Politics & 
Society, Vol. 34 Issue 2, (Jun 2006): 222; Konisky, “Innovations,” 815. 
 27 
that are best suited for the issue but that do not violate statutory requirements for 
transparency or minimum input.58 
Quantitative Criteria 
The more a process satisfies the qualitative criteria, the more likely it is to take 
longer to plan, produce and finish. The quantitative criteria cost, time and location are of 
no less importance than the qualitative.59 In fact, they may be the most important 
constraints on planners and managers. Chapter 2 noted the funding constraints on 
groundwater Districts and Areas. If the cost of a process is too prohibitive, its qualitative 
strengths bear little relevance. The pressure to meet deadlines or act in a sense of urgency 
can obscure the benefits of taking more time. Finally, logistical problems stemming from 
a large geographical area can increase cost and time. Having reviewed the criteria to 
evaluated public involvement processes, the following sections describe several processes 
and their strengths and weaknesses. 
OPEN MEETINGS 
An open meeting is one that is open to the public because a majority of a 
governmental body is present where “public business or public policy over which the 
governmental body has supervision or control is discussed or considered or in which the 
governmental body takes formal action.”60 The governmental body must give the public 
notice of the meeting and hold the meeting in a central location. By statute, it is optional 
for the governmental body to address the public or seek input from the public during the 
meeting. The purpose of an open meeting is to promote transparency in government. 
Anyone can attend, including media. Anyone who cannot attend a public meeting can 
                                               
58 Kovach, “Introduction,” 11. 
59 PCI, Practical Guide, 2; Carpenter, “Techniques and Strategies,” 69, 96-97.  
60 State of Texas Government Code, Chapter 551, Open Meetings, 
http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/gv.toc.htm (accessed January 11, 2008). 
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request copies of records such as agendas and minutes. Other than transparency and 
flexibility, open meetings do not meet any of the other qualitative criteria, but they are a 
building block for public engagement, allowing the public to witness discussion and 
decision making. The obvious quantitative advantage of open meetings is that they are 
inexpensive, place no additional time burdens, and are already held at a central location.  
PUBLIC HEARINGS 
A public hearing is an open meeting where the governmental body actively 
solicits citizen testimony or comment on a matter of public business or public policy. 
Public hearings are used widely to take comment on many public issues, including 
resource management and environmental planning. For example, the Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality uses public hearings in its pollution permitting programs.61 
State law specifies little in the way of regulation of these hearings, and the rules are left 
to Districts and Areas to carve out themselves. 
Relative to other methods, public hearings are fast and cheap. Taking only a few 
hours, and costing virtually nothing, the hearings are an easy and transparent way to seek 
input for or against an issue. Like open meetings, there are several weaknesses. Primarily, 
the traditional concept of a public hearing indicates there is a one-way line of 
communication from a participant to a governing body, not a dialogue. This one-way 
method of communication does little to foster trust among the public and decision 
makers. The inherent self-selection bias of those who attend the hearing to voice opinions 
is also a limitation. Only those who make the time commitment to attend the meeting are 
heard. Although the public is permitted to write letters to the governing body if they are 
unable to attend the meeting, some interests may still go unrepresented. The level of 
                                               
61 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 
http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/comm_exec/opa/pub_part.html (accessed September 9, 2007). 
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knowledge on the subject can range from minimal to great, but decision makers cannot 
necessarily separate out informed comments from uninformed. 
A less obvious advantage is the flexible nature of a public hearing, which could 
correct for some of the disadvantages. A governmental body could elect to first address 
those in attendance and share information. They could ask questions and foster dialogue. 
Depending on the sensitive nature of the policy issue and level of trust, the meeting might 
need to be structured and possibly hosted by a neutral facilitator. Chapter 4 further 
explores the implications of the flexibility of public hearings and open meetings, 
including benefits and the necessity of meeting statutory requirements in the DFC 
process. 
CONSENSUS BUILDING 
Overview of the Process 
Consensus building is defined as “an effort in which government agencies and 
other affected parties seek to reach agreement on a course of action to address an issue or 
set of related issues.”62 A decision is made by agreement of all parities rather than by 
majority vote. Because all parties are in agreement as to the decision, they pledge not to 
attempt to obstruct the agreement or its implementation. The Policy Consensus Init iative 
group writes, “Consensus outcomes can build the broad support necessary to carry out 
actions that would otherwise be difficult to enforce.”63 Thus, the first objective of 
consensus building is for the parties involved, including the sponsor and the stakeholders, 
to buy into the process. A sponsor is an entity “willing to support and endorse the use” of 
a process.64 A typical example is a governing body such as a GMA board, but private 
                                               
62 PCI, A Practical Guide, 2, 5, 6. 
63 Ibid., 8. 
64 Carpenter, “Techniques and Strategies,” 94. 
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parties such as not-for-profit or for-profit organizations could be sponsors of a consensus 
process. Stakeholders then are the remaining parties with an interest in the outcome of the 
process and the final decision made by the sponsor. 
The sponsor and the stakeholders work together to set their own guidelines for the 
process in the beginning. “Ground rules should be mutually agreed upon by all 
participants and not established solely by the sponsoring agent.”65 The sponsor contracts 
with a neutral facilitator to conduct an assessment of the issue, ensure that all parties who 
should participate are invited to do so, and work with all parties to design the process and 
determine the rules. The assessment typically entails research on the historical context of 
the policy issue as well as interviews with the governing body, stakeholders, and others 
referred to the process.66 
Participants in consensus building are generally individuals who believe they can 
represent the interests of a group with similar values. The key point in the last sentence is 
the word “interests.” In consensus building, participants are not asked to share just their 
position. Positions, such as no increase in groundwater pumping, can be shared in any 
public input method. In consensus building participants must explain the interest, such as 
concern for the impact of widespread drought, behind the position so that common 
interests are identified and addressed. As noted in Chapter 2, many of the adversarial 
stakeholder groups actually had common interests. As part of the ground rules 
determined in the beginning, participants must also decide how they will communicate 
with the constituents that they represent. 
Other important steps in the process include to: 67 
 Make logistical choices such as a timeline and location(s), 
                                               
65 PCI, A Practical Guide, 2. 
66 Carpenter, “Techniques and Strategies,” 64. 
67 Bulleted list paraphrased from Carpenter, “Techniques and Strategies,” 76-93. 
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 Keep record of the process and the outcome for clarification and transparency, 
 Seek the advice of technical experts to explain complex data and answer 
questions, when necessary, 
 Evaluate the process midway and at the end to reflect on what was successful, 
unsuccessful and why. 
Like public hearings, consensus building is used for many public policy issues, 
including resource management and environmental planning cases. Sometimes consensus 
building is used in informal settings such as a neighborhood deciding on the permitted 
uses of an outdoor trail (walking, running, bikes and dogs). In other cases, consensus 
building has become a much more formal process. Several northern states have 
popularized a process called Coordinated Resource Management (CRM).68 In this 
process, stakeholders of a natural resource use consensus to reach a decision in 
conjunction with a governmental regulatory body. Originating with the Soil Conservation 
Service and the Nevada Association of Conservation Districts in the 1950s, CRM was 
specifically developed to address natural resource planning conflicts.69 Stakeholders learn 
how to express their interests rather than their positions and work together toward an 
outcome that all team members support. Francher writes, “The whole community 
participates in shared decision making, which produces the best and most widely-
endorsed plans.”70 A neutral facilitator aids in the process, and participants are 
volunteers. The end results are management objectives and action plans to achieve the 
identified desired goal.  
                                               
68 States with CRM groups include California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, 
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69 Ibid. 
70 Susan Francher, “CRM in New Hampshire,” in A Resource Manual for Coordinated Resource 
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As an example, much like statewide water planning in Texas, for decades New 
Hampshire has required statewide forest planning to address land ownership issues, 
determine the future of forests, and develop policies for management.71 The John E. 
Sargent State Forest agency used Coordinated Resource Management and a steering 
committee of stakeholders to develop the future vision of the forest and decide on action 
items to achieve that vision. The resulting report, “Vision of New Hampshire’s Forest 
Resource: The Desired Future Landscape Condition,” was submitted for public review, 
revised, and used to assess the forest’s current condition and work toward the future 
condition.72 The Wyoming Department of Agriculture and the Society for Range 
Management publish materials on CRM and offer training and assistance for CRM 
projects in other states.73 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
The consensus building process has several strengths. Neutral facilitation builds 
trust and fosters an atmosphere of transparency. To be successful, consensus building 
requires commitment from those involved, both sponsor and stakeholder buy-in. Since 
participants agree on the rules before even talking about the public policy issue, the 
process is flexible. For example, the sponsors and parties can decide on how often to 
meet and whether the outcome is binding or non-binding. In other words, the consensus 
group may make the final decision, or they may formulate a recommendation that is then 
considered by the sponsor/governing body. The flexible nature of designing the process 
also leaves room for informing participants on the process or the issues if everyone is not 
at the same knowledge level. Even if participants feel they can accurately represent the 
interests of one group, it does not mean that the participant is well informed about all 
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issues related to the case. Ideally, the consensus process itself will spread information, 
but due to constraints on time and financial resources, the sponsors may not have the 
opportunity to ensure everyone is fully informed. The assessment also helps eliminate the 
self-selection bias by ensuring all potential interests are invited to participate and be 
represented. 
Compared to open meetings and public hearings, consensus building processes 
satisfy more qualitative criteria. One qualitative disadvantage that is a subset of flexibility 
may be of concern for sponsors and participants. While the fact that several parties have 
come together to collaborate may present a larger range of possible outcomes, by 
definition parties must compromise to reach a decision when using consensus building. In 
some cases, a compromise may not be in the best interest of the public, the parties 
involved, or the resource in question. Full exploitation or full conservation may be best. 
Before agreeing to a consensus building process, parties must analyze what type of 
outcome will be in their best interest.  
Unlike open meetings and public hearings, quantitative disadvantages are more 
prominent. Depending on the complexity of the issue and number of stakeholder groups 
involved, planning and convening a consensus building process often takes weeks or 
months. Using one or several professional neutral facilitators to foster trust and 
transparency can cost from $100 to $200 per hour.74 Finally, depending on the span of the 
geographical area relevant to the case, location and travel logistics can present a problem. 
Governing bodies pressed for time and money may not consider this process viable. 
                                               




Overview of the Process 
Political scientist Ned Crosby developed the trademarked Citizens Jury process in 
the 1970s.75 He founded a think tank called the Center for New Democratic Processes, 
and it later became the Jefferson Center.
76
 A typical Citizens Jury process entails the 
agreement of a sponsoring agent to consider the recommendations of a group of regular 
citizens regarding a policy issue. A sponsor could be a government body such as a group 
of County Commissioners, an interest group such as a neighborhood association, or a 
regulatory body such as a transit authority.  
An advisory committee works with the sponsor, stakeholders, and neutral 
facilitators to research the background of the issue, develop a charge for the jury, and 
select the witnesses and jurors.77 The advisory committee may be made up of members of 
the sponsoring organization, issue experts from outside the jurisdiction, and community 
leaders. In developing the charge for the jury, the advisory committee must decide what 
questions need to be answered in the jury’s recommendations. Within the U.S. cases, 
charges were often split into three parts, asking the jury to articulate and prioritize values, 
develop strategies, and recommend action steps regarding the particular policy issue.78  
Witnesses are selected based on subject matter expertise and must capture the full 
range of information and opinions on the policy issue. Witnesses may range from not-for-
profit advocacy groups, to industry representatives, to staff workers within the sponsoring 
agency. Finally, a jury pool is selected randomly by telephone or mail, and after a brief 
interview process twelve to twenty-four jurors are selected to participate. This planning 
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76 Ibid. 
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part of the process can take from a few weeks up to several months, depending on the 
complexity of the policy issue and the number of parties involved.79  
When all components are set in place, the jury assembles and witness 
presentations begin. The presentation to the jury lasts five days, typically enough time to 
address the policy issue without overburdening the participants. Jurors are compensated 
for their time. After each presentation, the jury is allowed to ask questions of each 
witness. At the end of each day and on the final day, jurors deliberate amongst 
themselves in private and write a recommendation in their own words. The 




The purpose of the Citizens Jury process is to “empower a microcosm of the 
public to deal effectively with complex issues.”
81 
The underlying theory is that given 
ample time and information, a sample of the general population will make reasoned and 
legitimate recommendations or decisions regarding a particular issue. Crosby lists seven 
elements that are essential to the success of the Citizens Jury process:
 82
 
1. Microcosm of the community: randomly selected citizens will adequately 
represent the demographics of the population, not just special interests; 
2. Size: the jury should consist of as large a number as possible without becoming 
unwieldy. The Jefferson Center recommends twenty-four; 
3. High-quality information: witnesses representing stakeholder groups should 
present their own views to the jury, not through the third party facilitator. Jurors 
should be allowed time to question witnesses directly; 
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4. High-quality deliberation: facilitators must organize the process in a way flexible 
enough for jurors to ask questions of each other during deliberations while 
structured enough that the process remains on track and no one person controls 
the discussion; 
5. Minimize bias and outside manipulation: facilitators must be neutral and jurors 
should be able to “express their final recommendations in their own words;” 
6. Fair agenda and hearings: an outside advisory group should select witnesses and 
set the proceeding agenda; 
7. Sufficient time: five days is the norm because it is long enough to explore 
complex issues but short enough to make the process attractive to participants. 
Additional important pieces include: 
83
 
 building in an introductory period at the beginning to familiarize the jury with the 
process and a general overview of the policy problem;  
 building in an evaluation period at the end for jurors to evaluate the process, 
especially facilitator neutrality;  
 reaching agreement with the sponsoring agent to at least consider if not accept the 
jury’s recommendations;  
 extending the public engagement process beyond the jury through media attention 
and a web presence. 
From the 1970s through the 1990s, the Jefferson Center conducted Citizens Juries 
at the local, state and national level on many topics including education, health care, tax 
reform, and elections.
84
 The Jefferson Center published five cases of Citizens Juries 
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conducted on issues related to environmental planning. The summary of one case is 
provided here as an example. The remaining summaries are found in Appendix C. 
In 2001, several governing agencies in the Minneapolis region grew concerned 
with the challenge of disposing of increasing tons of solid waste over the next 15 to 20 
years due to population growth. The Twin Cities Solid Waste Coordinating Board, made 
up of metro area county commissioners, sponsored a Citizens Jury to advise on strategies 
for managing regional solid waste that satisfied the economic, environmental and public 
needs.
85 
This case illustrates the pattern in charges to the jury to establish values, 
strategies and action steps regarding the policy issue. The charge in this case was: 
1. What are the values, in order of priority, that should be reflected in a solid waste 
management strategy for the metropolitan area? 
2. Given those prioritized values, what is the preferred solid waste management 
strategy for the metropolitan area? 
3. To implement the preferred strategy, what tools should be used and what (if any) 
actions should be taken by government or others?
86
 
The jury’s 25 pages of recommendations prioritized six major values for a solid waste 
strategy, identified efforts toward reduction and reuse of solid waste as the preferred 
method out of five possible management strategies, and communicated more than 50 
actions that could help the Board, the private sector and the public to achieve the 
preferred strategy. 
International Variations of the Citizens Jury 
While Crosby developed the citizens jury process in the U.S., political science 
professor Peter Dienel simultaneously developed a similar Planungzellen or “planning 
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cells” process in Germany. The German government provided funding and commissioned 
Dienel and his Research Institute for Citizen Participation to hold planning cells on a 
multitude of policy issues. In the beginning, issues were focused at the local level, but 
now regional and national issues are included. In contrast to Crosby’s preferences for 
keeping juries small and contained, Dienel usually holds multiple juries of 25 at the same 
time in different regions.
87
 Juries are also held successively on the same issue. Since 
jurors are randomly selected, no one group can claim to have been “systematically 
excluded.”
88
 As a result, there is little public resistance claiming that the process and 
outcome are not representative of the community and its views. 
Since the Institute for the Public Policy Research of London began advocating the 
citizens jury process in the 1990s, the process has been used hundreds of times in the 
United Kingdom, particularly surrounding issues of health policy and environmental 
planning for wetlands and waste management.
89
 Support for the process comes from top 
government administrators down to the local level.
90
 The skeleton of the process 
remained the same, however, several adaptations have been documented including three 
days with the jury instead of five, fewer number of staff facilitators, and the 
recommendations not written entirely by jurors but with help from or totally by staff and 
advisors.
91
 Presumably, these adjustments were made to reduce time and costs. 
Other adaptations have been proposed or experimented with by U.K. researchers. 
In the inter-jury forum, two juries meet separately to hear testimony, deliberate and make 
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recommendations. One jury consists of randomly selected citizens from the community, 
and the other consists of direct stakeholders in the outcome. The two juries then meet 
together to formulate recommendations for the sponsor.
92
 In the case where this 
adaptation was carried out, the stakeholder jury was not satisfied with the process or the 
outcome. However, the author claims that this may have been due to the nature of the 
issue considered by the juries – that it was not a “ripe” issue of importance – rather than 
the process itself.
93
 Other criticisms were that the process was too time consuming and 
expensive since each aspect was essentially carried out three times.
94
 
Another adaptation is the network jury. In response to a call by the European 
Union to use citizens juries in the Water Framework Directive (WFD), Kenyon proposes 
a network of juries to accommodate the complexities of the water resource management 
process.
95
 A similar modification was made in the Agriculture and Water Quality jury 
process in the U.S. in 1984. The fact that the river basins cover a large geographic area, 
cross political and administrative boundaries, and that the WFD process is a long-term 
planning process, the normal citizens jury format of twelve to twenty-four people making 
recommendations in one week was not ideal.
96
 However, Kenyon proposes creating a 
network of juries across each administrative jurisdiction that is held regularly every six 
months or year.
97
 Kenyon also advocates transparency in every aspect of the process and 
seeking as much media attention as possible in order for the larger public to accept it.
98
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Open juries are a third adaptation. Ward suggests that to truly achieve legitimacy 
and accountability the citizens jury process should be as open and transparent as 
possible.99 Open juries encourage wider social learning and connections to political 
processes.
100
 “[Open juries] may help to build new horizontal relations of trust within 
communities and vertical linkages with experts.”
101
 Ward gives five elements to an open 
jury: 
1. An agenda arrived at through open consultation; 
2. An open witness policy; 
3. An extended time frame; 
4. A critique of rationalistic forms of debate; 




Ward recognizes that there are potential problems with such an open jury. For example, if 
the process is open for anyone to be a witness, disparities could arise in resources to 
gather and present information to the jury.
103
 Additionally, the use of internet technology 
to facilitate the open forum introduces problems of access (though most people have 
access to internet, not everyone does), self-selection (whereas jurors are selected 
randomly, those visiting the website have sought out to do so), and cost (employing 
technology and staff who can set up and maintain it can be expensive).
104
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Strengths and Weaknesses 
Citizens juries meet all three qualitative criteria. Rather than yes or no answers 
from an anonymous poll or limited comment from self-selected stakeholders at a public 
meeting, the output of a citizens jury includes prioritized values and action steps.105 The 
process utilizes neutral facilitators to minimize bias, and its use abroad demonstrates its 
flexible nature. Sponsors should be open to the process because the decision is non-
binding, they are likely to receive more and better ideas related to the outcome than if 
they acted on their own, and as Goodin suggests they can view the process as “market 
testing,” whether or not the sponsor can sell a policy to the people.106 With citizens juries, 
by taking that decision process out of the hands of the direct stakeholders, the range of 
outcomes becomes wider. The jury could recommend a decision focused on one policy 
option or another, or some combination of any or all of the options.  
There are some inherent disadvantages of citizens juries and but there are also 
potential ways to overcome them. One of the first key problems with citizens juries is 
legitimacy and accountability. Citizens juries lack formal authority, and critics argue that 
the recommendations are illegitimate and lack significance.107 Jurors are not elected or 
appointed like public officials, or identified in an assessment like consensus building 
participants. Instead, jurors are randomly selected. The goal is for those selected to be as 
representative of the population affected by the issue as possible. Kenyon posits that it is 
difficult to achieve statistically significant representation of a population through random 
selection or moderated selection, but that there is no doubt that once informed those 
selected make intelligent decisions for their community.108 Kenyon goes on to say that 
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media coverage, transparency, internet presence and non-binding recommendations 
mitigate legitimacy and accountability problems.109 Through these other measures, 
citizens who were not selected to be part of the process still have access to the 
information and, depending on the level of input allowed, may be able to voice their own 
opinions to jurors and decision makers. The non-binding nature of the outcome alleviates 
risk for stakeholders and decision makers because if they believe the jury’s 
recommendations are truly unsound, then they do not have to consider them. 
Furthermore, depending on the issue before the jury and the level of trust among 
differing stakeholders and the sponsor, stakeholders may be reluctant to put influence on 
decisions in the hands of the general public. Stakeholders may feel that the decision at 
hand is not for the public to make, or they may fear that the jurors will be co-opted by the 
sponsor(s) and any bias they may have. The more that the issue before the jury relates to 
a public good rather than a private good, the less likely the occurrence of the former 
feelings. The fact that the citizens jury process emphasizes information sharing, reason, 
and deliberation means the opportunity for co-optation of participants is unlikely.110 
While qualitative disadvantages are easily overcome, the quantitative 
disadvantages are not. The length of time for the entire citizen jury process and the total 
cost depend on several factors. First, the scope of the project influences how much 
preparation time is needed by the sponsor, advisory committee and facilitators. The more 
complex the policy problem, the more time will be needed. Second, this length of time, 
plus the number of staff, the number of jurors, and how much the jurors are compensated 
for their time affect the total cost of the project. Of the case studies reviewed, the time 
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ranged from about three months to one year. Costs are not reported with each case study, 
but the Jefferson Center states that total costs range from $35,000 to $90,000.
111
 
Another concern, especially with cases of environmental or resource planning, is 
that scientific data will be too numerous and too complex for the jurors to comprehend 
within five days. The Jefferson Center faced such concerns with the case of 
Environmental Risk in 1996 and presentations about specific sources of pollution and 
their potential effects.112 The key to overcoming this problem is for the advisory 
committee and witnesses to adequately summarize the data and find ways to explain it in 
lay terms. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The four processes just described represent a range of options available, from the 
extreme minimum of open meetings to an extreme maximum deliberative process such as 
the citizens jury. These processes are not exhaustive of all those available, but illustrate 
the range without overwhelming this report.  
Review of these public input processes reveals that the qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation criteria are inversely correlated. One of the principles of ADR 
processes is that they save the parties involved both time and money compared to 
traditional conflict resolution processes. However, in the case of conflicts in 
environmental planning and management, whether or not the process employed saves 
time or money is relative, depending on the circumstances of the case, the alternative 
methods possible, and opportunity cost of those resources. Whether sponsors choose any 
of the four processes, the time needed to engage the public and reach a decision will 
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depend on the scope of the problem and the level of public participation. The cost will 
depend on the time as well as how many people will need to be compensated and by how 
much.  
This chapter provided an introduction to the evaluation criteria, the four processes 
and the strengths and weaknesses of each process in regard to the criteria. The general 
evaluation of those methods may be useful for many other types of public policy and 
resource management issues. The evaluation reveals that the larger the project the more 
resources needed; but sponsors must also consider the non-monetary value of benefits 
such as public buy-in, including the decreased likelihood that decisions will face legal 
challenges, and creative decisions that may arise as part of these processes. The next 
chapter explores how these four methods can borrow from each other to reach a method 




Chapter 4: Application and Evaluation 
This chapter applies the methods, discussed in the previous chapter, specifically 
to the case of groundwater management in Texas so that conclusions may be drawn 
within individual GMAs about which process offers the best balance of the criteria and 
under what circumstances. No one process will stand out across the board because each 
GMA has its own set of constraints that will factor into which process is the most 
practical. Similarly, no one process will stand out for other policy issues because each 
issue will also have its own set of constraints that may be similar to groundwater but that 
will also vary. 
OPEN MEETINGS 
When a GCD or GMA board meets to discuss groundwater management, it is 
required by statute do so in an open meeting. The qualitative advantage of open meetings 
is the promotion of transparency, an important first step. However, because the board is 
not required to address the public or seek public comments, traditional open meetings are 
not a public involvement method conducive to dialogue. The greatest quantitative 
advantage of open meetings is that they have no additional costs. A not so obvious 
advantage is that they are actually quite a flexible process. As long as the open meeting 
statute requirements are met, other elements may be added to augment the meeting. Such 
elements include time segments set aside to address the public and share information. For 
instance, a GMA or GCD board member could outline what the board does and does not 
have authority over. Or the GMA or GCD manager could explain what a DFC is and how 
it will be used by the various water planning authorities. 
All GMA respondents to the questionnaire reported holding open meetings. Some 
sought public comment on DFCs, including through the information sharing methods 
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noted above, and some did not. The usefulness of comments varied. Some GMAs that 
reported actively seeking public comment and those that made an effort to share 
information among stakeholders and managers at their meetings also reported that the 
feedback they received from citizens was very useful in crafting a DFC.113 Useful 
comments ranged from information about water demands, ideas for water conservation 
awareness programs, as well as feedback about helpful tools for the DFC and 
management process such as a website.114 Thus, GMAs who took advantage of flexibility 
and made an effort to expand the purpose of their open meetings were able to obtain more 
useful information – informed input – in return.  
PUBLIC HEARINGS 
As previously noted, all GMAs must hold at least one public hearing before a 
DFC is submitted to the TWDB. The advantages, like those of open meetings, are 
transparency, relative low cost and quick turnover. While public input is actively sought, 
neutrality and representation are not as satisfactory as they could be. Again, the 
advantage of flexibility could correct for this shortfall. In terms of groundwater planning, 
public hearings could be held more frequently by GMAs, and GCDs for that matter, than 
the one per year required by HB 1763. An Area or District could step away from the 
formal term “public hearing” toward a more welcoming “public dialogue” where 
information is shared in all directions between board members, hydro geologists and 
representatives of the public and moderated by a neutral facilitator. This concept is 
similar to that employed by GMA 9 with assistance from the University of Texas. The 
expansion of public hearings in this way is similar to expanding open meetings as 
discussed above. Yet, bringing in a neutral facilitator, as GMA 9 did, can help eliminate 
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the appearance of bias and foster feelings of trust. Furthermore, expanding open meetings 
or public hearings to be more of a dialogue facilitated by a third party helps overcome 
some of the DFC specific problems discussed in Chapter 2, namely addressing: 
 vagueness and ambiguity by helping others understand what a DFC is,  
 fostering trust among multiple and competing stakeholders, 
 spreading public information about groundwater management and conservation. 
An expanded hybrid version of open meetings and public hearings, a “public 
dialogue,” is potentially the best method for augmenting public involvement in the DFC 
process without accumulating disproportionate cost and time factors. The entire length of 
the process may take a year or less. Meetings would be longer and held more often, an 
impartial facilitator or record keeper may cost a few hundred dollars, but the process 
would not be as involved as the remaining two methods discussed in this report. 
CONSENSUS BUILDING 
None of the GMAs responding to the questionnaire reported using a consensus 
building process, although some commented that they might try it in the future. The 
general steps to convening consensus building in the DFC context may be as follows:115 
1. A GMA board agrees to sponsor a consensus building process, the outcome of 
which is the language for a desired future condition for the GMA. The board 
contracts with a professional neutral facilitator to provide administrative support 
and mitigate bias. The board may involve stakeholders in choosing an acceptable 
neutral facilitator. 
2. The neutral facilitator could take time to study the historical context of 
groundwater planning in the GMA, current problems related to groundwater and 
scientific data regarding the resource and population demographics. The 
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facilitator does not necessarily need to be a subject matter expert but does need to 
understand the scope of the policy issue. This could take a few weeks. 
3. The neutral facilitator and GMA board work together to identify stakeholders or 
interests groups to participate in the consensus building process. Those 
stakeholders in turn make recommendations about who else should be included 
and so forth until all parties are identified. The time consumed will depend on 
how many people the facilitators need to interview. Each interest group chooses a 
representative and that representative is invited by the facilitator to participate in 
the consensus process. 
4. The neutral facilitator organizes an information session for participants explaining 
consensus building and negotiation concepts as well as providing a common body 
of information on the DFC process and the historical and current groundwater 
situation in the Area. The impartial facilitator works with the stakeholder 
representatives and the board to determine rules for the process and create a 
timeline. 
5. The participants share the interests of the group they represent. They begin to 
identify common values, prioritize those values and identify potential components 
of a desired future condition. The neutral facilitator moderates negotiations while 
the participants try to reach consensus. The time needed for this step will depend 
on the number of representatives, the variations in interests, and the availability 
and complexity of groundwater and demographic data. This step is likely to take 
several meetings over the course of weeks or months. 
6. Once consensus is reached, the group’s outcome is reported to the GMA board 
which then finalizes language for the desired future condition and seeks the 
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group’s final approval before holding the statutory public hearing and submitting 
the DFC to the TWDB. 
Regular board meetings will still uphold open meeting regulations, but the consensus 
meetings could be closed as long as a majority of the governing body is not present. This 
would not violate HB 1763 rules. Some may worry that, by holding open consensus 
meetings, attendees could disrupt the negotiation process. Even though consensus 
meetings could be closed, to maintain transparency, consensus meetings should be open, 
and facilitators can assist in minimizing disruption. For example, there may be a 
comment period for observers at the end of the meeting, or observers may submit written 
comments at the end of a meeting or via a website. 
The entire length of this process could range from six months to a year. Though 
the qualitative advantages of buy-in, mutual trust, neutral facilitation, informed input and 
flexibility shine in consensus building, the potential cost of such a lengthy process is the 
main barrier. In previous years, the length of time itself was a barrier as GMAs tried to 
reach the December 2007 early deadline for inclusion in the next Regional Water Plans. 
Even though all but one of the GMAs missed the deadline and the next formal deadline is 
September 2011, length of time could still be a concern depending on whether GMAs 
have agreements with their regional water planning areas to include a DFC.116 For 
example, GMA 8 submitted DFCs for several minor aquifers by the early deadline, but 
has an agreement with regional water planning areas to include the DFC for the major 
Trinity aquifer that is planned for submission this spring.117   
                                               




A citizens jury would be the most involved method for a GMA to use. If direct 
stakeholders are willing to allow such input to be put into the hands of a “microcosm of 
the public,” then this method would satisfy each qualitative criterion and address nearly 
every problem outlined in the DFC process in Chapter 2. The steps for using a citizens 
jury process in a GMA may include:118 
1. The sponsoring agent, the GMA board, contracts with a neutral third party to 
facilitate the process. The facilitators and board assemble an advisory committee 
that might consist of some GCD board members, hydro geologists or water policy 
experts from an outside Area, and local community leaders who, if it is possible, 
do not have a direct stake in the outcome such as a church pastor or school 
principal. 
2. The advisory committee and facilitators research the historical context of 
groundwater in the Area, craft a charge for the jury, and begin selecting witnesses. 
The charge, similar to that typical of the trademarked Citizens Jury process, may 
be: 
a. What are the values, in order of priority, that should be reflected in this 
GMA’s desired future condition of the aquifer(s)? 
b. Given those prioritized values, what is the preferred management strategy 
to achieve the desired future condition of the aquifer(s)? 
c. To implement the preferred management strategy, what tools should be 
used and what actions should be taken by the GMA board or others, taking 
into account their respective limits of authority? 
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The witness list may include TWDB staff, state or private hydro geologists, GCD 
general managers, and advocates for stakeholder groups including 
environmentalists and conservationists, business owners, developers, farmers and 
ranchers, property owners, etc.  
3. The impartial facilitators meanwhile could use a mail or telephone survey to 
select jurors. While email is very prevalent these days, it is still not as pervasive 
as a regular mailing address and should not be used for juror selections. An email 
list compiled by a GMA would be too biased. To keep costs low, twelve jurors 
could be selected instead of twenty-four.  
4. The GMA board and facilitators select a location to hold the witness presentations 
and juror deliberations. Again, to keep costs low, this process could be from three 
to five days. On the final day, jurors draft their answers to the charge and give the 
report to the GMA board and then fill out evaluations. 
5. In keeping with Ward’s theories, and to address transparency and the spread of 
public information, the citizens jury process could be open to the public, covered 
by the local media, and daily reports could be uploaded to a GMA website. 
Conducting a citizens jury on the GMA level presents the problem of providing 
accommodations or additional compensation if jurors and witnesses must travel long 
distances to the central location. Kenyon’s theory of a network jury may have interesting 
implications when applied to the DFC process. Recall that a network jury consists of 
holding citizen juries in smaller jurisdictions first, such as a GCD, and then 
representatives from each smaller jury come together on a jury for a larger jurisdiction, 
such as a GMA. A network jury process is more suitable for long term planning of a 
resource that affects a large geographical area and population. A network jury process 
could be held regularly, at least once every five years or the length of the DFC review 
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cycle. The logistics of the network allow informed input from the local DFC level to the 
regional GMA level. Unfortunately, conducting a network jury process, where each GCD 
holds its own local jury and then reports to the GMA, could also exponentially increase 
costs and time of the process.  
Like consensus building, the citizens jury process could be open or closed. A 
closed jury process does not violate the HB 1763 rules, which only states that official 
meetings where a majority of a governing body is present must be open to the public. 
However, much like consensus meetings, to uphold the value of transparency the 
advisory committee and facilitators should hold an open jury process and allow for public 
comment at the end of each day or through written submissions via a website. 
Again, an inherent difference between the citizens jury process and the consensus 
building process is that the outcome, whatever it may be, is determined by a group 
representing the general public, not a group representing the stakeholder interests. The 
considerable drawbacks to buy-in were explored in Chapter 3. A potential reconciliation 
is another hybrid process: conducting a citizens jury to get the reasoned and informed 
opinion of the general public, and then bring that opinion to the table at a consensus 
building process. 
FURTHER ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
No matter which of the four traditional or hybrid processes is used by a GMA, 
websites complement all of them and are a low cost means to share information. Several 
GMAs already have their own website or have designated a particular GCD website to 
host GMA information.119 A web presence allows the GMA to post meeting times, 
locations, agendas and minutes; any documents that are drafted by the board or others; 
press releases or archives of local media; contact information, email addresses or 
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discussion forums; links to the TWDB website, the regional water planning group, or 
other useful sites. As more households, libraries and schools receive access to the 
internet, a GMA website can be an invaluable tool for communication and public 
engagement. 
An additional point in favor of expanding open meetings and public hearings, or 
using a more involved process such as consensus building or a citizens jury, is that the 
sheer momentum of an organized process can help a GMA reach a deadline. Only GMA 
8 submitted some desired future conditions to the Texas Water Development Board by 
the early deadline December 2007. GMAs 1, 9, and 13 came close.120 In the questionnaire 
response, Ron Fieseler of GMA 9 wrote, “[The process] not only provided extensive 
information and public input, it served as a driving force which kept our GMA process 
moving forward at a steady rate.” Though it is an additional cost, the act of contracting 
with an impartial facilitator and paying them an hourly rate is an incentive not to let the 
process wax and wane over a period of time.  
Finally, when trying to determine a desired future condition of an aquifer, there is 
no such thing as too much information. Expanding the involvement process to any one of 
these methods brings in more people with diversified insight and cultivates a dialogue 
based on real information rather than hearsay and speculation. If an expanded public 
input process engages one more well owner, one more retired geologist, one more family 
that just moved from another state, then the desired future condition is that much closer to 
reflecting public desires. GMA managers note that no matter what, there will always be 
someone who is not satisfied, who disagrees for the sake of disagreeing, or who will 
petition the desired future condition and pursue legal action. This may be true, but 
alongside Hardin’s claim that an unmanaged commons will always fail and a managed 
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one at least has a chance of enduring, a DFC process with limited public input will surely 





Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Public involvement processes in the United States have evolved over the last 
hundred years from merely informing the public and seeking acceptance to actually 
letting the public make decisions with governing bodies. Yet, the standard public hearing 
remains a popular default process because it meets the minimum requirements for 
transparency and taking comments without taking an enormous amount of time or 
money. Participants are left unsatisfied and some go on to legally challenge the decision 
made in the hearing. Researchers are still evaluating the range of public engagement 
methods and their usefulness in an array of policy and conflict situations. This report 
contributes to current research by showing that in some cases the traditional open 
meetings and public hearings processes may not warrant total abandon. Taking advantage 
of their flexible nature and augmenting them to satisfy qualitative criteria such as 
neutrality and informed input can make a process much more meaningful without 
overwhelming financial or temporal resources and complicating logistics. 
CONCLUSIONS ON GROUNDWATER IN TEXAS 
Using the economic criteria of famed economist and native Texan Garrett Hardin, 
groundwater is unmistakably a common pool resource and must be managed as one, less 
we see it succumb to the individual desires of private landowners and potential drought. 
Even though the legislature has created a policy response for public management of this 
quasi-public good, the Rule of Capture remains in place causing an inherent conflict 
between the right of landowners and the management process. Many wonder how much 
longer the Rule of Capture can remain a sustainable water policy in Texas. The Rule 
discourages conservation and complicates water planning methods such as desired future 
conditions. Property rights and the Rule of Capture are centuries old concepts, entrenched 
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in Texas politics and culture. To abolish the Rule of Capture will either take a crisis in 
water supply or a change in leadership in the legislature. Neither one of these scenarios 
are farfetched due to the increased population growth rates of both native and non-native 
Texans and the potential of climate change bringing periods of prolonged drought. Booth 
and Crow suggest that if the Rule is to remain in place, the legislature must at least 
provide more explicit delegation of authority to GCDs to avoid further legal battles.121 
In the mean time, Texans must work under the system of regional water planning 
and groundwater management areas as explained in House Bill 1763. Under the current 
system, groundwater conservation districts must work together as a GMA to decide on 
the desired future conditions of the aquifer(s). HB 1763 mandates GMA and GCD boards 
hold open meetings and at least one public hearing before a DFC is submitted to the 
Texas Water Development Board, but offers little funding and direction. Such a vague 
mandate allows for local control and creativity, but so far this system has produced 
confusion, mistrust, and a few desired future conditions from one GMA. Groundwater 
managers and boards have several alternatives that will still satisfy the statutory 
requirements and collect informed input useful in crafting the language and model runs 
for a DFC. 
CONCLUSIONS ON PROCESSES AND EVALUATIONS: YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR  
The discussion on public and quasi-public goods and the evaluation of four public 
input methods may have broader applications for public managers. Whether natural 
resource management or other policy issues, the barriers to public engagement may be 
similar – lack of trust among stakeholders, a sense of urgency, and scarce financial 
resources. The public engagement processes reviewed in this report are not exhaustive of 
all the options available to governing bodies. However, the qualitative and quantitative 
                                               
121 Booth and Crow, “Regulatory Dance,” 37. 
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criteria can be useful to evaluate other methods that are beyond the scope of this report. 
Before considering any process, governing bodies or other sponsors must identify what 
they want out of the engagement process. Does the sponsor want the participants to be 
advocates for a policy, for a management process, or to spread information to their 
friends, neighbors and coworkers? Does the sponsor want to leave with information or 
data, suggestions for action, or values and interests? No matter what the policy issue, a 
public engagement process: 1) is a delivery system for education on a policy issue or 
problem; 2) has to draw participation from more people than just the “usual suspects;” 3) 
typically has to get participants to go beyond stating their position and instead elicit their 
interests so that common interests may be identified and prioritized. 
This study finds that traditional open meetings and public hearings satisfy the 
quantitative criteria of low cost and short turnaround, but do not meet the qualitative 
criteria of informed input and building trust through neutrality and representation. The 
key fourth qualitative criterion, flexibility, is a saving grace that allows these processes to 
be expanded and molded to overcome their qualitative disadvantages while maintaining 
lower cost and shorter time burdens. Consensus building and citizens juries are much 
more complex processes and present the reverse situation – more than satisfying the 
qualitative criteria while also increasing time and cost.  
The correlation between satisfying qualitative and quantitative criteria and the 
increase in time and cost lead to the ultimate cliché conclusion that one gets what one 
pays for. However, for a management plan to be approved and implemented, the time and 
the price may be worth it. A high up-front cost of a full public engagement process may 
be less than future legal costs to uphold a decision that is made with little public input 
and thus is protested by one or more parties. Increased public involvement should result 
in fewer protestations or lawsuits because it reaches out to all who have an interest and is 
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intended to add legitimacy and support for the decision.122 Finally, implementing hybrid 
versions of the processes, such as using a neutral facilitator at public meetings is a little 
step that can go a long way toward building trust and acceptance without prohibitively 
increasing the cost. 
Some limitations to this report include the narrowness of GMA information 
available and the exclusion of some public processes beyond the scope of this report. 
Only in depth case information was readily available for GMA 9. Answers to the 
questionnaire from other GMAs were often brief, and not all GMAs responded. More 
research is needed on these and other processes such as survey methods. Partnering with 
research institutions for assistance can further contribute to the body of knowledge on 
groundwater management and on public involvement processes.  
As of the final drafting of this report, GMA 9, who used a quasi-experimental 
version of the hybrid “public dialogue” process, has submitted several desired future 
conditions scenarios to the TWDB for use in groundwater models. GMA 9 is reviewing 
the model results in a series of public meetings and plans to vote on the desired future 
conditions in summer 2008. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter 4 applied each of the four public involvement methods to the specific 
case of groundwater management in Texas and formulated what each process might look 
like. Each process has its own set of strengths and weaknesses. Determining which 
process is the best will depend on the individual circumstances in each GMA including 
sense of urgency, number of competing interests, and budget. The analysis leads to the 
conclusion that three options exist for each GMA going forward in the DFC process. 
                                               
122 PCI, A Practical Guide, 8. 
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Option 1: GMAs can seek minimal levels of input at open meetings and public 
hearings, following the statute to the letter, and not embracing other opportunities for 
public involvement.  
Option 2: GMAs can adapt aspects of other public input processes to open 
meetings and public hearings to improve upon the information gathered, neutrality and 
participation. Employing impartial facilitators at meetings and conducting a “public 
dialogue” where information is shared rather than collected are less expensive ways to 
meet the qualitative criteria. Or GMAs can opt to use consensus building or citizens jury 
methods. For any of the three methods they choose, if they do not have the funds 
available in current budgets, GCDs have the authority to levy small taxes and fees within 
the district to cover costs.123 GCDs would have to agree as a GMA about how to cover 
the costs for the public involvement process and consider that taxes must be approved by 
voters at the GCD level. 
Option 3: GMAs can opt to use the hybrid “public dialogue,” consensus building 
or citizens jury methods but minimize the financial cost by seeking other funding sources. 
These other sources could include asking the legislature for an appropriation of funding 
to each GMA; asking the legislature for an increase in staff at the TWDB that are trained 
in neutral facilitation and dispute resolution;124 seek grant money from public or private 
policy dispute resolution institutions; and foster partnerships with state universities or 
                                               
123 According to the Texas Water Code Section 36 a GCD may issue bonds subject to the approval of the 
water commission (36.171a-g). These bonds may be paid through ad valorem taxes or fees (36.172). Bonds 
secured with taxes must be approved by a majority of registered voters in the GCD (36.180). GCDs have 
the authority to levy taxes not to exceed 50 cents on each $100 of assessed valuation and approved by a 
majority of registered voters in the GCD (36.201). GCDs have the authority to collect fees for a variety of 
services (36.205). Texas Water Code, http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/wa.toc.htm (accessed March 30, 
2008). 
124 In the 80th Legislative Session the legislature approved about $200,000 per year in funding for the 
TWDB to hire several groundwater modelers, groundwater quality monitors, and one additional staff 
person for GMA and GCD relations. Robert Mace, Texas Water Development Board, interview with the 
author, March 21, 2008. 
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other research institutions.125 Working with other private or public institutions allows for 
further research into these methods and their uses for natural resource planning and 
environmental conflict resolution. 
Option 1 is likely to lead to further protest and legal challenges. Options 2 and 3 
are recommended as the most practical and the most likely to improve public input 
processes for the DFC process. As long as open meetings rules are followed and the final 
procedural public hearing held, these enhanced processes will not violate HB 1763. They 
will provide District and Area boards with informed public input while balancing cost. 
The time and cost factors of these expanded processes will add the momentum needed to 
conclude with a DFC by the state’s deadlines. Utilizing websites will complement all of 
the processes and provide another low-cost means for information sharing and 
participation. Though it may be unfeasible to satisfy all interests with one or more desired 
future conditions, an expanded process that truly attempts to engage as much of the 
public as possible will be more satisfactory and in the end less costly than one that does 
not. 
                                               
125 A list of potential information resources is found in Appendix D. 
 61 
Appendix A: Maps 
 
Map 1: Regional Water Planning Areas A through P.126 
                                               
126 TWDB. http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/mapping/index.asp (accessed February 2, 2008). 
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127 TWDB, http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/mapping/index.asp (accessed February 2, 2008). 
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Map 3: Groundwater Management Areas 1 through 16
128
 
                                               
128 TWDB, http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/mapping/index.asp (accessed February 2, 2008). 
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Appendix B: Desired Future Conditions Questionnaire 
A copy of the following questionnaire was emailed to each GMA on the TWDB 
website, except GMAs 5 and 11 which have no manager or board. The ten GMAs that 
responded were: 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, and 15. GMAs 4 and 6 reported that their 
DFC process, including forums for public input, has been minimal because the TWDB 












[    ] I hereby authorize the use of my name with any quotes or summaries of the 
information I have provided in this questionnaire. 
 
[    ] I hereby request that my name not be associated with any quotes or summaries of 
the information I have provided in this questionnaire. 
 
Please provide detailed answers to the following questions.  
 
1. Did you or someone from your GMA/GCD attend the decision making and 
cooperative problem solving conference, hosted by the Center to Public Policy 
Dispute Resolution, in October of 2006?  
 
2. Did your GMA submit a desired future condition to the TWDB by December 
2007 early deadline? 
 
3. Is there a sense of urgency regarding groundwater management in your 
GMA/GCD? Explain why or why not. 
 
4. How has your GMA/GCD involved the public in the desired future condition 
process? (Examples: Public hearings, open meetings, consensus building, website, 
 65 
surveys, etc. – see definitions on the following page) Please explain in detail 
below. (If you have not yet involved the public, please skip to question five) 
 
a. How many times did you involve the public and in what format? 
 
b. Did you incur any costs from your involvement process? (Travel, 
refreshments, payment for a neutral facilitator, etc.) 
 
c. How were expenses covered? (Cost sharing, donations, individual 
expense, etc) 
 
d. Did you get the information you wanted from this process? 
 
e. How was the public input used in your decision making process? 
 
f. Are there other processes you would have liked to use but did not? If so, 
what were they and why weren’t they used? 
 
5. Are you planning on including or continuing the involvement of the public in 
future groundwater management and planning in your GMA/GCD? Please 
explain in detail below. 
 
a. If yes, what kind of process will you use? (Examples: Public hearings, 
open meetings, consensus building, website, surveys, etc. – see definitions 
on the following page) 
 
b. How many times will the public be involved and in what format? 
 
c. How do you plan to use the public input that you receive? 
 
d. Are there other processes you would like to use, and if so, what are they? 
 
e. If you do not plan to involve the public in the GMA planning process, 
please explain the reasons for not doing so. 
 







Open meeting: A meeting open to the public because a majority of a governmental body is 
present where “public business or public policy over which the governmental body has 
supervision or control is discussed or considered or in which the governmental body takes formal 
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action.”129 At open meetings, public comment or testimony is not required but may be solicited at 
the discretion of the governmental body. 
 
Public hearing: An open meeting where the governmental body actively solicits citizen 
testimony or comment on a matter of public business or public policy; may also be called a 
“public meeting.” 
 
Consensus building: “an effort in which government agencies and other affected parties seek 
to reach agreement on a course of action to address an issue or set of related issues.”130 A 
decision is made by agreement of all parties rather than by majority vote and thus no party to the 
agreement will attempt to obstruct the agreement or its implementation. 
 
                                               
129 State of Texas Government Code, Chapter 551, Open Meetings, 
http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/gv.toc.htm (accessed January 12, 2008). 
130 Policy Consensus Initiative, A Practical Guide to Consensus, (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Policy 
Consensus Initiative, 2002),  2, 5, 6. 
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Appendix C: Summaries of Environmental Citizens Jury Cases in the 
U.S. 
AGRICULTURE AND WATER QUALITY PROJECT – 1984 
Eleven total entities sponsored this project including several government agencies 
such as the Minnesota Department of Agriculture.
131 
The policy issue was the impact of 
agricultural externalities on ground and surface water quality as well as impacts of 
potential regulation on the industry.
132
 The sponsors committed to seriously consider the 
jury’s recommendations, which were that the state should provide $12 million additional 
funding annually to the issue, require counties to take responsibility, and for farmers to 
do as much as they can voluntarily.
133
 This case was the first time that the Citizens Jury 
process was conducted statewide with five regional panels of twelve jurors each and then 
three people from those panels sat on a state panel.
134 
The process took about one year.
135
 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK – 1996 
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, with funding from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, sponsored a citizens jury process that took about a 
year due to the large amount of prep time on the twelve environmental issues discussed. 
The jury was charged with “[evaluating] the seriousness of the risks associated with the 
issues and compare those risks to one another.”
136 
The Agency then considered the jury 
                                               
131 Ned Crosby, Final Report of the Citizens Panel on Agriculture and Water Quality. (Minneapolis, MN: 
The Center for New Democratic Processes, January 1985), i. 
132 Ibid., 1. 
133 Ibid., 2. 
134 Ibid., i. 
135 Ibid., 1. 
136 Ned Crosby, The Citizens Jury on Comparing Environmental Risk Final Report, (Minneapolis, MN: 
The Jefferson Center, 1996), 2-3. 
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outcome when setting priorities for their future planning. Witnesses included advocacy 
groups, representatives from industry, and academicians.
137
 
LAND USE AND GROWTH – 1997 
The Dakota County Board of Commissioners sponsored a Citizens Jury to receive 
input on the Dakota County Comprehensive Plan on growth and development.
138
 The 
jury developed policy statements and action steps and the Board used them in the plan.
139
 
The witnesses included advocacy groups, representatives from industry, and county 
employees.
140
 This case illustrates how the Jefferson Center staff and advisory group took 
steps to ensure that the jury was representative of the county population by assessing 
census data and asking questions.  
The following chart summarizes how the Jefferson Center and advisory 
committees use census data for the areas they are working in to closely match jury 
demographics to population demographics. Sometimes staff and advisory committees 
survey the community and ask specific questions about preconceived attitudes towards 
the policy issue. This way the jury is balanced between attitudes that the average 
community member has before receiving extensive and quality information from expert 
witnesses. For example, in this case the County conducted a survey about citizens 
thoughts on how the community should grow. One question included whether the current 
growth rate was too fast, just right or too slow. Prospective jurors were then asked the 
same question and selected to represent the survey response numbers.141 
 
                                               
137 Crosby, “Environmental Risk,” 16. 
138 Ned Crosby, The Citizens Jury on Dakota County’s Comprehensive Plan Final Report, (Minneapolis, 
MN: The Jefferson Center, 1997), 1-2. 
139 Ibid., 5. 
140 Ibid., 20. 
141 Crosby, Dakota County, 3. 
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Jury Demographics in Dakota County Land Use and Growth Case - 1997142 
 
 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE – 2002 
The Environmental Protection Agency was the sponsoring agent and 
enthusiastically agreed to consider recommendations by the jury on values and actions 
related to global climate change.
143
 Jurors were sampled only from Baltimore, Maryland, 
and were charged to identify which global warming impacts were of the most concern 
and what actions should be taken by the government. Witnesses included scientists, 
                                               
142 Crosby, Dakota County, 17. 
143 Ned Crosby, The Citizens Jury on Global Climate Change Final Report. (Minneapolis, MN: The 
Jefferson Center, 2002), 1. 
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advocates and representatives from industry.
144
 The jury identified economic, 
environmental and social concerns including the costs of clean food and water and the 
negative impacts of poor air and water quality.
145
  The jury recommended a multitude of 
actions of consumers, industry, the U.S. government and the international community. 
 
                                               
144 Crosby, Global Climate Change, 31. 
145 Ibid., 6. 
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Appendix D: Public Policy Dispute Resolution Resources 
 
Center for Public Policy Dispute Resolution 
The University of Texas School of Law 
727 E. Dean Keaton St. 
Austin, TX 78705 
Phone: (512) 471-3507 
Fax: (512) 232-1191 
Website: http://www.utexas.edu/law/cppdr 
Jan Summer, Executive Director 
 
Frank Evans Center for Conflict Resolution 
South Texas College of Law 
1303 San Jacinto St. 
Houston, TX 77002 
Phone: (713) 646-2998 
Website: http://www.stcl.edu/feccr/  
 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
4220 TAMU  
College Station, TX 77843 




Website: http://ww.jefferson-center.org/  
 
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs 
The University of Texas 
2315 Red River St. 
Sid Richardson Hall, Unit 3 
Austin, TX 78712 
Phone: (512) 471-3200 
Website: http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/  









Society for Range Management 
10030 W 27th Ave 
Wheat Ridge, CO 80215 
Phone: 303-986-3309 
Fax: 303-986-3892 
Website: http://ww.rangelands.org/srm.shtml  
 
Texas Association of Mediators 
P.O. Box 191208 
Dallas, TX 75219 
Website: http://www.txmediator.org/ 
 
U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution 
130 S. Scott Ave. 
Tucson, AZ 85701 
Phone: (520) 901-8501 
Website: http://www.ecr.gov/   
 
Wyoming Department of Agriculture 
2219 Carey Avenue 
Cheyenne, WY 82002 
Phone: (307) 777-7321 
Fax: (307) 777-6593 







Citizens Jury: a sponsoring governmental body agrees to consider the recommendations 
of a small sample of the area population regarding a policy issue. An advisory committee 
convenes the jury, directs the course of action, and selects a range of expert witnesses to 
provide testimony. A group of neutral facilitators guide the advisory committee through 
the convening process and coordinate the jury presentation and deliberation processes.146 
Consensus Building: “an effort in which government agencies and other affected parties 
seek to reach agreement on a course of action to address an issue or set of related 
issues.”147 A decision is made by agreement of all parties rather than by majority vote and 
thus no party to the agreement will attempt to obstruct the agreement or its 
implementation. The process is often led by neutral facilitators. 
Desired Future Condition (DFC): “a management goal that captures the philosophy and 
policies addressing how an aquifer will be managed.”148 
Groundwater Management Area (GMA): “an area suitable for the management of 
groundwater resources.”149 The Area boundary generally follows the boundary of major 
and minor aquifers. 
Groundwater Conservation District (GCD): “a district that has the authority to 
regulate the spacing of water wells, the production from water wells, or both.”150 The 
District boundary is purely political and does not follow any geological boundary. 
                                               
146 Crosby and Nethercut, “Citizens Juries,” 111-119. 
147 Policy Consensus Initiative, A Practical Guide to Consensus, (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Policy 
Consensus Initiative, 2002), 2, 5, 6. 
148 Mace et al, “A Streetcar Named DFC,” 3. 
149 Ibid., 1. 
150 Texas Water Development Board. http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/gwrd/gcd/faqgen.htm#g1 (accessed 
January 27, 2008). 
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Managed Available Groundwater (MAG): “the amount of groundwater available to be 
permitted for beneficial use in accordance with the DFCs.”151 
Open Meeting: A meeting open to the public because a majority of a governmental body 
is present where “public business or public policy over which the governmental body has 
supervision or control is discussed or considered or in which the governmental body 
takes formal action.”152 At open meetings, public comment or testimony is not required 
but may be solicited at the discretion of the governmental body. 
Public Hearing: An open meeting where the governmental body actively solicits citizen 
testimony or comment on a matter of public business or public policy; may also be called 
a public meeting. 
Texas Regional Water Plans: “provides for the orderly development, management, and 
conservation of water resources and preparation for and response to drought conditions in 
order that sufficient water will be available at a reasonable cost to ensure public health, 
safety, and welfare;  further economic development;  and protect the agricultural and 
natural resources of that particular region.”153 Regional areas were developed based on 
ground and surface water resource delineations, political boundaries, utility and economic 
development, and other factors deemed relevant.154 Plans must be submitted to the 
TWDB at a minimum of every five years beginning January 2001.155 
                                               
151 Abukhater, et al., “The Future of Groundwater”, 1. 
152 State of Texas Government Code, Chapter 551, Open Meetings, 
http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/gv.toc.htm (accessed January 12, 2008). 
153 Texas Water Code, Section 16.053a., http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/gv.toc.htm (accessed January 12, 
2008). 
154 Ibid, b. 
155 Texas Administrative Code, Chapter 367.5b., http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.viewtac 
(accessed February 21, 2008). 
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Texas Water Development Board (TWDB): Created in 1957, this state agency provides 
“water planning, data collection and dissemination, financial assistance and technical 
assistance services to the citizens of Texas.”156 
 
                                               
156 Texas Water Development Board, http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/about/aboutTWDBmain.asp, accessed 
January 27, 2008. 
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